6AV7800-.....-.A.0 - SIEMENS - Datasheet.Directory

Applications & Tools

Answers for industry.

Cover

Security for PC-based Automation

Systems with Windows Embedded

Operating Systems

SIMATIC PC-based Automation

Security Guidelines  October 2011

2 Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879

Industry Automation and Drive Technologies Service & Support Portal

This article is taken from the Siemens Industry Online Support. The following link

takes you directly to the download page of this document:

http://support.automation.siemens.com/WW/view/en/55390879

Caution

The functions and solutions described in this article confine themselves to the

realization of the automation task predominantly. Please take into account

furthermore that corresponding protective measures have to be taken up in the

context of Industrial Security when connecting your equipment to other parts of the

plant, the enterprise network or the Internet. Further information can be found

under the Content-ID 50203404.

http://support.automation.siemens.com/WW/view/en/50203404

If you have any questions concerning this document please e-mail us to the

following address:

mailto:online-support.industry@siemens.com

You can also actively use our Technical Forum from the Service & Support Portal

regarding this subject. Add your questions, suggestions and problems and discuss

them together in our strong forum community:

http://www.siemens.com/forum-applications

Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879 3

SIMATIC PC-based Automation

Security for Windows Embedded

Operating Systems

Security Guidelines

Industrial Security 1

Firewall to Protect

Network Services 2

Access Protection for

Windows Systems 3

Protection against

Malware 4

Methods for

System Hardening 5

Operating System

Software Updates 6

Internet Links 7

History 8

Legal information

4 Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879

Legal information

Warning notice system

This manual contains notices you have to observe in order to ensure your personal

safety, as well as to prevent damage to property. The notices referring to your

personal safety are highlighted in the manual by a safety alert symbol, notices

referring only to property damage have no safety alert symbol. These notices

shown below are graded according to the degree of danger.

DANGER

DANGER indicates that death or severe personal injury will result if proper

precautions are not taken.

WARNING

WARNING indicates that death or severe personal injury may result if

proper precautions are not taken.

CAUTION

CAUTION with a safety alert symbol, indicates that minor personal injury

can result if proper precautions are not taken.

CAUTION without a safety alert symbol, indicates that proper ty damage can result if

proper precautions are not taken.

NOTICE indicates that an unintended result or situation can occur if the relevant

information is not taken into ac count.

If more than one degree of danger is present, the warning notice representing the

highest degree of danger will be used. A notice warning of injury to persons with a

safety alert symbol may also include a warning relating to property damage.

Qualified Personnel

The product/system described in this documentation may be operated only by

personnel qualified for the specific task in accordance with the relevant

documentation, in particular its warning notices and safety instructions. Qualified

personnel are those who, based on their training and experience, are capable of

identifying risks and avoiding potential hazards when working with these

products/systems.

Proper use of Siemens products

Note the following:

Legal information

Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879 5

WARNING

Siemens products may only be used for the applic ations described in the

catalog and in the relevant technical documentation. If products and

components from other manufactur ers are used, these must be

recommended or approved by Siemens. Proper transpor t, storage,

installation, assembly, commissioning, operation and maintenanc e are

required to ensure that the products operate safely and without any

problems. The permissible ambient conditions must be co mplied with. The

information in the relevant documentation must be observed.

Trademarks

All names identified by ® are registered trademarks of Siemens AG. The remaining

trademarks in this publication may be trademarks whose use by third parties for

their own purposes could violate the rights of the owner.

Disclaimer of Liability

We have reviewed the contents of this publication to ensure consistency with the

hardware and software described. Since variance cannot be precluded entirely, we

cannot guarantee full consistency. However, the information in this publication is

reviewed regularly and any necessary corrections are included in subsequent

editions.

Foreword

6 Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879

Foreword

Purpose of the documentation

This documentation provides information and recommendations on security

aspects of PC-based automation systems with Windows Embedded operating

systems. The objective is to provide an overview of the basic and most important

options and mechanisms.

Required knowledge

This documentation is intended for persons involved in configuring, commissioning

and servicing PC-based automation systems with Windows Embedded operating

systems. Basic administration knowledge and IT techniques for Microsoft Windows

operating systems are required.

Validity of the documentation

This documentation is valid for the following PC-based automation components:

• SIMATIC IPC227 / IPC277

• SIMATIC IPC427 / IPC477

• SIMATIC IPC577

• SIMATIC IPC627 / IPC677

• SIMATIC S7-mEC, EC31 (embedded controller)

with the following embedded operating systems:

• Microsoft Windows Embedded Standard 2009 (WES2009)

• Microsoft Windows Embedded Standard 7 (WES7)

Table of Contents

Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879 7

Table of Contents

Legal information......................................................................................................... 4

Foreword....................................................................................................................... 6

Table of Contents......................................................................................................... 7

1 Industrial Security ............................................................................................. 8

1.1 Differences between office security and industrial security ................. 8

1.2 Security management .......................................................................... 8

1.3 Defense in-depth strategy .................................................................. 10

2 Firewall to Protect Network Services ............................................................ 11

2.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 11

2.2 Disabling services .............................................................................. 11

2.3 Local Windows Firewall...................................................................... 11

2.4 External firewall .................................................................................. 12

2.5 Typical communication services of SIMATIC products...................... 12

3 Access Protection for Windows Systems..................................................... 14

3.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 14

3.2 Windows user accounts ..................................................................... 14

3.3 Security policies ................................................................................. 14

4 Protection against Malware............................................................................ 15

4.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 15

4.2 Use of virus scanners......................................................................... 15

4.3 Use of whitelisting software................................................................ 17

5 Methods for System Hardening ..................................................................... 18

5.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 18

5.2 Analysis of user actions...................................................................... 18

5.3 Analysis of “routes of infection” .......................................................... 19

5.4 Measures for system hardening......................................................... 19

6 Operating System Software Updates ............................................................ 22

6.1 Introduction......................................................................................... 22

6.2 Basic update options.......................................................................... 22

6.3 Manual update.................................................................................... 24

6.4 Automatic Windows Update ............................................................... 24

6.5 Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) ....................................... 24

7 Internet Links ................................................................................................... 25

8 History............................................................................................................... 25

1 Industrial Security

1.1 Differences between office security and industrial security

8 Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879

1 Industrial Security

1.1 Differences between office security and industrial

security

The security mechanisms integrated in PCs and Windows operating systems

generally provide a high level of security. However, these measures are typically

designed for the requirements of office environments. In industrial security, the

security objectives are quite similar, but, to some extent, their priorities differ

significantly. While the top priorities in office IT are typically the confidentiality and

integrity of information, plant availability or operability come first in industrial

security.

When selecting appropriate security measures, it must always be ensured that they

provide the necessary level of protection without having any negative impact on the

actual operation. In this document, the description of the measures also includes

examples of possible critical effects.

1.2 Security management

General information

Security management is an integral part of an industrial security concept to

address all security-relevant aspects of an automation solution – be it of a single

machine, a plant section or an entire plant. As the potential threats to an

automation solution change over its life cycle independently of its actual function,

this is rather a security management process. The objective of this process is to

achieve the necessary security level of an automation solution and to maintain it on

a permanent basis.

Establishing a security management process also ensures, for example, that due

the risk analysis included in it, only appropriate countermeasures will be

implemented to reduce the risks. For example, such a process could look as

follows:

Risk analysis

Guidelines,

organizational

measures

Checks &

improvements

Technical

measures

1 Industrial Security

1.2 Security management

Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879 9

Table 1-1

No. Step Description

Risk analysis The process starts with the identification and assessment of

risks of the used components, machines or plants. Based on

this assessment, respective countermeasures will be taken.

Examples of possible threats to PC-based automation

components are:

• Infection with malware (data media, network services,

downloads, …)

• Unauthorized use of operating system functions /

applications

• Denial-of-service effects (network overload / system

overload, …)

• Spying/data manipulation

Guidelines,

organizational

measures

As not all risks can be reasonably minimized by technical

measures, an industrial security concept also includes

organizational measures. The organizational measures

include, for example, the definition of responsibilities,

industrial security training or even processes to resume

productive operation after security incidents.

Technical

measures

Technical measures normally start with physical access or

access protection mechanisms. Furthermore, they also refer,

for example, to the security mechanisms of PC systems

shown in this document, which are, in turn, supplemented by

application-specific security mechanisms.

Checks and

improvements

The final step is to check the implemented security measures

to see if they work as planned. Due to the changing threats,

the risk analysis should be repeated at regular intervals and

the measures should be modified where necessary.

1 Industrial Security

1.3 Defense in-depth strategy

10 Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879

1.3 Defense in-depth strategy

Typically, not all the risks of an industrial plant can be minimized by individual

countermeasures. Therefore, effective industrial security concepts are normally

based on a combination of several complementary countermeasures. Such a

protection procedure using countermeasures that are layered and coordinated with

one another is referred to as a “defense in-depth” strategy. However, such a

concept does not refer to individual components, it always refers to an entire

system.

In simple terms, the individual protection layers around a plant can be divided into

the following groups:

Table 1-2

Group Description

Plant safety Physical protection against access by unauthorized persons

Plant IT security Network and IT security mechanisms

Access protection Application-specific security mechanisms

The security measures described in this document can be assigned to the plant IT

security or machine IT security layer.

For more basic and detailed information on this topic, please visit the Siemens

Industrial Security website listed in Siemens Industrial Security website.

2 Firewall to Protect Network Services

2.1 Introduction

Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879 11

2 Firewall to Protect Network Services

2.1 Introduction

Many applications installed on a PC system offer their services also to the network

so that they can be used, for example, from other PCs. Traditionally, this includes

server services such as web servers, mail servers or FTP servers but also

monitoring or remote maintenance mechanisms (e.g., remote desktop).

Furthermore, such communication mechanisms are also used for mere PC-internal

communication, for example between background services and applications (with

GUI).

Overall, these mechanisms are very convenient, but they also involve certain risks.

Each network service with security vulnerabilities is a security risk that requires an

appropriate response. To generally minimize the risk, only network services that

are actually required should be active or accessible via the network.

NOTICE If the PC system can only be acces sed via remote access (e.g., remote

desktop, iAMT), it is particularly important to ensure that these serv i ces are

not accidentally disabled or blocked.

2.2 Disabling services

The most effective protection of a network service that is not needed is to

completely disable it. Basic options to disable network services can be found here:

• Direct configuration of network services, for example when they provide

separate configuration user interfaces

• Indirect configuration of services via loadable engineering projects

• Services management of the Windows operating system

(“Control Panel > Administrative Tools > Services > Startup Type: “Disabled””)

A detailed recommendation cannot be made as to which services should be

enabled or disabled as it strongly depends on the used products and the

implemented automation solution.

2.3 Local Windows Firewall

An alternative option to protect access to network services is to use local firewall

software. Such a solution is particularly advantageous if the service is to be used

on the local PC system or if it cannot be disabled but external access is to be

blocked.

The current Windows Embedded systems already include such an integrated

firewall that protects against unwanted access via the network.

You can enable Windows Firewall via the Control Panel. Make sure that you

enable only network services that are to be externally accessed. You can enable or

disable these settings at any time by checking or unchecking the programs or

services in the exception list (“Exceptions” tab).

2 Firewall to Protect Network Services

2.4 External firewall

12 Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879

2.4 External firewall

In addition to the integrated firewall software of PC-based systems, there is also

the option to restrict access to network services via external security components.

For this purpose, security components such as SCALANCE S are used, whose

firewall mechanisms can allow or block access to network services. Aside from the

additional security functions of these components (e.g., VPN), the advantage of

this solution is that it is independent of the actual PC system. For example, the

local firewall may be affected by a malware infection while this software does not

affect the external firewall.

2.5 Typical communication services of SIMATIC products

The following table provides an overview of the communication services that are

typically used by SIMATIC products.

Table 2-1

SIMATIC

product Application Service Port

Access to internal HTML pages (HTTP) 80

Web Server

Access to internal HTML pages (HTTPS / SSL) 443

Connection to the Sm@rtServer 5800

Sm@rt

Server Connection to the Sm@rtServer 5900

Connection

establishment

135

Server

Communication dyn.

OPC via

DCOM

Client Communication dyn.

OPC via XML (client <=> server) 80

OPC

OPC UA (binary protocol) Communication 4840

UDP 137,

138

Archiving Archiving on a server

TCP 139

Configuration PC dyn.

Transfer via Ethernet

Panel 2308

50523

S7 controller 102

Communication between

Panel dyn.

PROFINET IO communication 34964

E-mail (SMTP server) 25

WinCC

flexible

Other

Modicon controller (Modicon channel MODBUS

TCP/IP)

502

OPC-UA discovery for discovering OPC-UA server

end points

4840

SIMATIC NET OPC UA-S7 server (TCP port) 4845

SIMATIC NET OPC UA-PNIO server (TCP port) 4847

Simatic

Net OPC Server

PROFINET CBA and OPC DCOM mode 135

2 Firewall to Protect Network Services

2.5 Typical communication services of SIMATIC products

Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879 13

SIMATIC

product Application Service Port

SIMATIC NET S7 OPC A&E Server dyn.

SIMATIC NET SIMOTION OPC A&E Server dyn.

SIMATIC NET SNMP OPC A&E Server dyn.

SIMATIC NET OPC DA Server dyn.

DLL hosting from remote inproc OPC server dyn.

ASP.NET for the OPC XML-DA IIS web service dyn.

SIMATIC NET PN CBA OPC server dyn.

NETBIOS name service for finding OPC servers

(UDP)

137

NETBIOS datagram service for finding OPC servers

(UDP)

138

OPC Enum dyn.

OPC Client SIMATIC NET OPC SCOUT V10 dyn.

Web Server HTTP port 80 web service (TCP) 80

CCAgent for the remote configuration of PC stations dyn.

RedundancyControl for the remote configuration of

PC stations

dyn.

PC Station

CCEServer for the remote configuration of the local

PC station

dyn.

HTTP WebServer (TCP) 80

SMTP (E-mail) 25

SNMP 161,

162

DHCP 68

FTP 20,

ISOonTCP 102

S7-300/400

CPs

PROFINET 135

ISO-on-TCP connections 102

SIMATIC NET PROFINET IO dyn.

ICMP incoming echo request dyn.

SNMP (UDP) 161

SNMP traps (UDP) 162

PROFIdrive ProfilServer dyn.

SIMATIC NET PROFIdrive BusServer dyn.

Other

SIMATIC NET Core Server SR dyn.

WinAC

RTX 0, 20, 21, 23, 25, 80, 102, 135, 161, 8080, 34962, 34963,

34964, 65532, 65533, 65534, 65535

3 Access Protection for Windows Systems

3.1 Introduction

14 Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879

3 Access Protection for Windows Systems

3.1 Introduction

In practice, many Windows Embedded systems are used with a user account with

administrative rights. This procedure may be very convenient, but it increases the

security risk posed by, for example, unauthorized modifications or infections with

malware.

One of the reasons for this is the fact that nearly all operations and settings on a

Windows system can be made with administrator rights. This makes it possible to

cancel all protection mechanisms that have been previously set up.

3.2 Windows user accounts

As with a standard operating system, an administrator account should only be used

for special administrative tasks when using a Windows Embedded operating

system. A user account with standard user rights should be used for regular

operation.

Such a user account with limited rights can be created with the graphical user

management once at least two administrators have been created.

NOTICE Make sure that you directly assign appropriate passwords to all user

accounts to avoid security vulnerabilities.

Alternatively, limited user accounts can also be managed directly via the

user/group management of Computer Management. This can be done both locally

and centrally via a domain controller.

3.3 Security policies

Depending on the use case, additional modifications of the security settings for the

user accounts or the entire system can be made using the security policies. These

security policies can be set both locally in the system and globally via domain

policies.

These policies allow you to define, for example, the following features:

• Minimum password length / password complexity requirements

• Minimum / maximum password age

• Account lockout threshold / duration

• Users who may log on locally or using Remote Desktop

• Users who may shut down the system

To access the local security policies, select “Administrative Tools” in the Control

Panel.

CAUTION When using security policies, it is absolutely necessary to consider the

effects on the respective automation application.

For example, when an account lockout thr eshold is specified, there is a

risk that access to user interfaces will be denied in critical situations.

4 Protection against Malware

4.1 Introduction

Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879 15

4 Protection against Malware

4.1 Introduction

As malware represents one of the biggest threats to PC-based automation

systems, this risk must be appropriately addressed. The protection mechanisms

described in the previous chapters provide a certain security, but there are still

routes of infection that are not covered by these mechanisms. Therefore, a

frequent request is to use virus scanners known from the Office environment also

for PC-based automation solutions.

4.2 Use of virus scanners

General information

When using virus scanners for PC-based automation solutions, it must be

considered that the availability and throughput of an automation solution have top

priority. However, virus scanners require resources already in normal mode – i.e.

there are no viruses – that are then not available for the automation task and

therefore have to be considered when selecting the PC platform:

• Computing power

While scanning, virus scanners use CPU computing power. This may cause an

increased base load of the PC and possibly result in longer automation

processes.

• Communication performance

Monitoring the communication for malware may reduce the communication

performance.

• PCI bus load, jitters

Particularly the scanning of files on the mass storage (HD, SSD, CF card) of

the PC may result in a bus load on the PCI or PCIexpress bus that may affect

access to devices for direct or distributed I/O.

The selection of the virus scanner is normally specified by the IT departments of

the end customer / owner as their aim is to perform centralized maintenance for

infrastructure protection and information security reasons.

The following sections provide recommendations on how to sensibly use virus

scanners in an automation solution. When selecting a virus scanner product, it

should be ensured that these recommendations can actually be implemented.

Updating the v i rus scanner

New malware appears almost daily, which spreads quickly, particularly via the

Internet. Even though automation solutions are rarely connected directly to the

Internet, short-term virus infection caused by devices in the plant network or data

media may still occur.

4 Protection against Malware

4.2 Use of virus scanners

16 Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879

Therefore, it is mandatory to regularly update the virus scanners. As a rule for the

update interval, the following rule typically applies here:

Generally, the use of a virus scanner is only useful if a

cyclic virus pattern upda te << 14 days

is ensured.

If regular updates at this interval cannot be reliably ensured, a virus scanner should

not be used as a virus scanner with obsolete virus patterns provides no real

security. Instead, alternative options for system hardening such as whitelisting

should rather be used.

Aside from the update cycle, the option to perform the update must also be

considered:

• Internet access: Generally, direct Internet access will not be available for

machines so that it will not be possible to use the typical automatic updates of

virus scanner products.

• Update via teleserv i ce: If a machine can be accessed at any time at the end

customer, it can also be considered to update the automation PC via

teleservice mechanisms – however, the overhead for many machines in the

field is considerable and the update must normally be synchronized with

production breaks at the end customer.

• Update by the end customer: The most sensible option is for the end

customer’s IT department to perform the update. Virus scanners used in

enterprise environments typically support centralized distribution of pattern

updates for various devices.

General settings for virus scanners

As availability and performance of the automation task are the top priorities of

automation solutions, the following boundary conditions should be considered

when selecting and using a virus scanner:

• No active scan during production times (performance, jitters)

In particular, complete scans of the PC must be postponed to times when there

is no active production, for example after the last production shift, during shift

change-over or general maintenance times.

• No active scan of the communicatio n (performance)

This avoids delays or slowing down of, in particular Ethernet-based,

communication.

• No quarantine, deletion or automa tic repair of (supposedly) infected files

Continuous operation of the machine/plant has priority. Due to quarantine,

deletion or repair attempts, the file no longer functions and the automation

solution fails – it may not fail immediately, but at a later time when the file is

actually needed. It may then no longer be possible to link the failure to the

original malware incident. Instead, the detected infection should only be

indicated.

• Central indication of a (supposed) virus infection

Local indication may be unfavorable for the following reasons:

– Unattended PC systems (“headless”) do not detect these messages and

countermeasures cannot be taken.

4 Protection against Malware

4.3 Use of whitelisting software

Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879 17

– The message indicating a virus infection eclipses the actual machine

operation. This means that important contents of the visualization

application may be overlooked or lost.

– This may confuse the operating staff and cause well-intentioned but

harmful panic reactions, for example hard shutdown of the PC.

Therefore, indication of the virus infection should be central depending on the

use case. Measures can then be assessed and initiated by qualified and

trained personnel of the end customer.

• Operation on Windo ws Embedded Standard systems

For operation on Windows Embedded Standard systems (WES2009, WES7),

the following must be observed:

– Check whether the selected virus scanner is approved for operation on

systems with WES2009 or WES7.

– Virus patterns and updates should not be stored on EWF/FBWF-protected

partitions or directories to ensure that they are stored permanently.

– Alternatively, EWF/FBWF must be disabled before updating the virus

patterns. When doing so, make sure that the state of the systems is secure

(e.g., reboot before “EWF commit and disable”, see also “Managing EWF

or FBWF in Embedded systems” in 6 Operating System Software

Updates).

– Windows Embedded Standard systems usually feature a CF card. The

storage capacity must have sufficient reserve to store the updates.

Training maintenance staff at the end customer’s facility

Essentially, the requirements for using antivirus software in the automation

environment differ from the requirements in the typical IT environment. Therefore,

all persons involved in service and maintenance (maintenance staff, IT

departments of the end customer, …) should be familiarized with the above-listed

principles and trained accordingly.

4.3 Use of whitelisting software

Whitelisting protection mechanisms ensure that only reliable programs and

applications are executed on a PC system. They prevent unauthorized software

from being executed and installed applications from being modified. This kind of

protection is available via security applications that have to be additionally installed.

Major advantages of whitelisting technology are:

• Low resource requirements

• Protective effects without regular pattern updates

• Automatic protection against third-party program codes (e.g., via a USB flash

drive)

• Increased protection against zero-day exploits

• Can be post-installed on existing systems – it is therefore particularly

interesting for operating systems for which the manufacturer no longer

provides updates.

5 Methods for System Hardening

5.1 Introduction

18 Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879

5 Methods for System Hardening

5.1 Introduction

As described in the previous chapter, the use of virus scanners in automation

solutions is subject to certain boundary conditions or, in some cases, cannot be

reasonably implemented. Therefore, other measures have to be taken to protect

the system against malware and unauthorized use.

The below-listed measures are only a small selection of possible measures. It is

mandatory to identify the routes of infection. As each implementation of an

automation solution is customized, the respective characteristic features have to be

taken into account. Therefore, the essential steps are as follows:

1. Analysis of user actions

2. Analysis of routes of infection

3. Determination of measures

5.2 Analysis of user actions

First, it is important to analyze which persons have access to or contact with the

automation solution. Typical users are:

• Operating staff

• Service and maintenance staff of the owner

• Service and maintenance staff of the OEM / machine manufacturer

• Service and maintenance staff of another company

(for example, of the “neighboring machine”)

• IT employees of the end customer

• Staff from production engineering and logistics

• Unauthorized users in the machine environment

For each of these users, it has to be defined which actions are to be performed – or

prevented – on a machine or which intentions these users may have. For example,

this can be:

• Operation of the machine in normal mode

• Access to Windows for setup purposes, making updates

• Transfer of files for production optimization or production planning

• Online access for production optimization or production planning

• Modification/extension of the configuration (well-meant improvements –

warranty!)

• Access to Windows for parasitic use, e.g. accessing the Internet (surfing the

Internet during breaks), installing Office software or games

• Sabotage to create additional “breaks”

5 Methods for System Hardening

5.3 Analysis of “routes of infection”

Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879 19

5.3 Analysis of “routes of infection”

In addition to the above-listed users and actions, intended to a greater or lesser

extent, possible routes of infection for malware have to be identified:

• Via the company/plant network

– Wired

– WLAN

• Via teleservice accesses

• For PG connection

• Via data media

– USB flash drive

– USB hard drive

– CF card / SD card

– CD/DVD

– RFID

– Bluetooth

– ...

5.4 Measures for system hardening

This section lists a number of normal measures. However, it cannot provide a

complete list of all possible measures and the measures are not suitable for all

possible cases. Additional measures must be determined or invented according to

the above analysis and the extent of the measures must, of course, be reasonable

in relation to the actual threat.

Mechanical protection of hardware interfaces

Reliable protection against infections via hardware interfaces can be established by

providing mechanical protection of interfaces against unauthorized use. This

includes:

• Placing the PC or programmable controller in an enclosed control cabinet

• Access protection for keyboard and mouse using locked drawers under the

screen

• Blocking of unused hardware interfaces

(e.g., network ports)

Disabling hardware interfaces that are not required

PC interfaces such as USB, etc. can normally be effectively disabled via software

configurations, for example via:

• BIOS (only generally)

• Windows Control Panel

• Network configuration

• Additional applications

5 Methods for System Hardening

5.4 Measures for system hardening

20 Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879

Disabling autostart mechanisms

The AutoRun or AutoPlay function automatically executes or runs software on a

removable storage medium that is connected to a PC. Malware can then be

installed without any explicit user action.

The AutoRun or AutoPlay function can be disabled. For a more detailed

description, please refer to the Microsoft Knowledge Base article on how to disable

AutoRun.

Disabling system services that are no t required

Just like network services, other system services can also be disabled to further

increase system security. However, this requires that these services be no longer

needed to perform the automation task or other necessary supplementary

functions.

Preventing unauthorized persons from accessing Windows

Essential protection of a PC in an automation solution can also be achieved by

preventing unauthorized persons from accessing the PC or by making it extremely

difficult for them to access the PC. To do so, two options are available:

• Limiting user rights using Windows means.

For details, see chapter 4 “Protection against Malware”.

• Locking Windows access, for example via the HMI application.

Locking Windows access using the HMI application can, or example, look as

follows:

• The PC is configured for autologin at boot and starts automatically with limited

rights as configured for a machine operator.

• When booting, the HMI application starts automatically. WinCC can be

configured so that no Windows access is possible until start.

• To allow Windows access for necessary maintenance work, a control element

to exit the HMI application can be configured in special, password-protected

maintenance screens.

Using write filters for embedded sy stems (EWF / FBWF)

Enhanced Write Filter (EWF) and File Based Write Filter (FBWF) allow the

protection of individual partitions of the mass storage against write access. Write

accesses during runtime are buffered in the RAM so that, from the software

perspective, it appears as if write access was possible. However, all write accesses

will be canceled when the next loss of voltage occurs or the next time the PC is

shut down/rebooted so that the PC starts in the state when enabling EWF/FBWF.

• By doing so, EWF/FBWF prevents software that has been installed without

authorization from remaining on the system on a permanent basis.

• However, it does not prevent the PC from infections by malware and the

malware can – as long as the PC remains turned on – continue to spread from

it. But as with software that has been installed without authorization, the

malware will typically be removed after rebooting.

• When enabling EWF/FBWF, it must be ensured that data is not stored on

partitions or directories that are not protected (EWF) or that were excluded

from protection (FBWF). It is absolutely necessary to follow the documentation

of the used software to see if and how data can be stored on unprotected

drives or directories.

5 Methods for System Hardening

5.4 Measures for system hardening

Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879 21

• If EWF/FBWF must be disabled for installation or configuration, the PC must

first be set to a defined, secure state. By disabling EWF/FBWF using the

“Commit&Disable” command, current system changes will be permanently

stored. If at this time, for example, malware has infected the computer, it will be

permanently stored on the mass storage because of the command. As a

precaution before executing the “Commit&Disable” command, the automation

PC should first be disconnected from the supply and, if necessary, removable

storage media should be removed and the PC should be restarted.

Protecting hardware-based remote maintenance mechanisms (iAMT)

For devices that support hardware-based remote maintenance mechanisms such

as Intel AMT, it must also be ensured that they are appropriately protected. As

these mechanisms allow comprehensive access to PC systems via the network,

the risk of unauthorized use exists also in this case.

If these mechanisms are not needed, they should, in the simplest case, be

disabled. When using these mechanisms, you should additionally use secure

access data and secure communication settings.

6 Operating System Software Updates

6.1 Introduction

22 Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879

6 Operating System Software Updates

6.1 Introduction

From time to time, Microsoft publishes corrections of its own products in the form of

patches. Some of these patches are used to increase the stability of the operating

system or applications; more frequently, however, they are used to resolve

security-relevant vulnerabilities before they can be exploited. However, Microsoft

typically releases these patches only for the Windows Standard and Server

operating systems and not for operating systems of the Embedded family.

The operating systems of the Embedded family (WES2009, WES7) are

componentized operating system versions of the standard PC operating systems

Windows XP and Windows 7 that are specially tailored to the respective hardware.

For industrial use, components that are not needed (e.g., Media Player, games, …)

are removed from the operating system. This is done, for example due to the

reduced size of the image, to allow the use of CF cards and thereby increase

robustness through non-rotating mass storage devices. In addition, special features

such as EWF / FBWF are integrated that due to the reduced number of write

accesses on CF cards, allow a longer service life (MTBF) of the system.

Therefore, when installing patches, only components of the operating system may

be updated that are actually part of the customized operating system. Otherwise,

there is a risk that the limited memory on the CF cards will be quickly exhausted by

unnecessary components. Only the operating system of WES7 and higher

automatically detects which patches have to be installed due to the operating

system composition.

CAUTION Before installing patches on productiv e systems, they al ways have to be

checked for compatibility on suitable test systems.

Furthermore, backups should be created to be able to quickly restore

productive systems in case of incompatibility.

6.2 Basic update options

General update options

The update mechanisms of standard PC operating systems (Windows XP /

Windows 7) and embedded operating systems (WES2009 / WES7) do not differ in

their approach.

To install patches, the following basic options are available:

• Manual update

Manual installation of downloaded Windows updates that are linked via

Microsoft bulletins.

• Automatic Windows Update – not for WES2009

Automatic download of Windows Security Updates via an Internet connection

to the Microsoft Windows Update server and manual installation on the

devices.

• Windows Server Update Services (WSUS)

Targeted provision of Windows updates for all groups or specific groups of

devices using a company-internal WSUS server.

6 Operating System Software Updates

6.2 Basic update options

Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879 23

CAUTION Installing patches during running operation on a p roductive system may

result in limitations of the real-time characteristics.

Furthermore, it may be necessary to reboot the sy stem after installing the

patches. It is therefore recommended that patches only be installed during

a maintenance phase of the productiv e system.

Characteristic features of embedded s ystems

Compared to standard Windows systems, certain characteristic features have to be

considered when updating embedded operating systems:

• All components of the patch are installed during the update – even if they were

not included in the original image. This fact must be taken into account with

regard to the available memory of the CF card.

• When EWF / FBWF are used on the system, they must be disabled before

installation and then be re-enabled. When doing so, it is recommended that

first a reboot be performed before disabling to restore the original system state.

• When using WSUS, additional script files (WUS-FS) are necessary that

automatically perform the handling with EWF / FBWF.

Tools for OEMs

In addition to the above-mentioned tools, there are a number of other Microsoft

tools that support, in particular, OEMs in servicing their own images. The following

tools are used to check updates and to install them in existing images:

• Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA)

Via an active Internet connection, MBSA determines the Windows Security

Updates necessary for the device.

• Package Scanner (Pkgscn)

Determines the Windows Security Updates necessary for the device from

updates that have already been downloaded.

• Deployment Image Servicing and Managemen t (DISM)

formerly: Package Mana ger (PkgMgr)

Command-line tools for servicing Windows images (WIM files).

• ImageX

Provision of WIM file to capture, modify and apply file-based data media

images.

• Sysprep

Preparation of WIM files for transfer to other computers.

These tools are not discussed in greater detail in these guidelines. For more

information on these tools, please refer to the Microsoft websites.

6 Operating System Software Updates

6.3 Manual update

24 Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879

6.3 Manual update

When a Windows Embedded system is updated, the necessary security updates

are first downloaded to any PC (with Internet access) via the Microsoft Download

Center (\2\).

The necessary updates can be determined first, for example, with the aid of

Microsoft Baseline Security Analyzer (MBSA).

After downloading the updates and, if necessary, transferring them to the target

system with the Windows Embedded operating system, these updates that are

available as separate files can be installed individually or on a script-controlled

basis.

While this variant is useful for a small number of PC systems, the overhead for

simultaneous update of several PCs increases rapidly.

6.4 Automatic Windows Update

In addition to manual update, the Windows update mechanism also supports

automatic update. Via an Internet connection to the Microsoft Update server, there

are regularly checks for new updates for the target system.

CAUTION When using this update method, automatic installation should not be used

as it may affect the automation process. Inste ad, updates should be

manually selected, downloaded and installed.

For SIMATIC PC systems, this mechanism is only available for Windows

Embedded Standard 7 and higher.

6.5 Windows Server Update Services (WSUS)

General information

Especially for operating or updating a larger number of PC systems, it is

recommended to use a central infrastructure for software distribution. For Windows

Server operating systems, Microsoft offers Windows Server Update Services

(WSUS) that allows targeted distribution of updates necessary for the client PCs. In

addition, WSUS provides the option to centrally obtain updates from Microsoft and

to individually assign the updates released for the respective devices in the local

(company) network.

WSUS with write filter support (WUS-WF)

Generally, WSUS does not provide support for the EWF/FBWF mechanism that is

common in Windows Embedded systems. As a consequence, after restarting the

system – for example after installing an update –, all changes that have been made

will be lost if the write filter was enabled.

In WES7, both EWF and FWBF can be automatically disabled during updating and

then re-enabled via VBScript files with the aid of WUS-WF (Windows Update

Servicing with Write Filter). This method can also be used to integrate additional 3rd

party updates. For more information, please refer to \3\.

7 Internet Links

Security for Windows Embedded Operating Systems

Version 1.0, Entry ID: 55390879 25

7 Internet Links

This list is by no means complete and only provides a selection of useful

information.

Table 7-1

Topic Title

\1\ Siemens

Industrial Security

website

http://www.siemens.com/industrialsecurity

\2\ Microsoft

Download Center

http://www.microsoft.com/downloads

\3\ Windows Update

Servicing with

Write Filter

http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff850921.aspx

\4\ Reference to this

entry

http://support.automation.siemens.com/WW/view/en/55390879

8 History

Table 8-1

Version Date Modification

V1.0 10/2011 First edition